Up the junction, and back to the drawing board?
The West Coast Main Line (WCML) through Staffordshire is configured on a four-track basis, with both the ‘Up’ line (trains towards London) and the ‘Down’ line (trains going northwards) consisting of a ‘slow’ and a ‘fast’ track. The layout of tracks is US-UF-DF-DS from the point of view of a train heading towards London.
The purpose of this arrangement is to allow a more efficient use of the tracks by separating slow services, such as stopping trains and freight, from fast express services. Crossing and passing points are provided at intervals to allow services to be moved between the tracks and to allow fast trains to pass slower ones on the same track.
When the HS2 design was originally developed, there was planned to be a significant delay between the completion of Phase 1 and the opening of Phase 2, during which time the only interchange point between HS2 and the WCML would be Handsacre Junction. With this in mind, Handsacre was designed with the most efficient, and the most expensive, configuration, which would feed northbound trains from the HS2 tracks directly onto the fast Down line and southbound trains on the WCML onto HS2 from the fast Up line. The complication, and hence higher cost, of this arrangement is that it requires the WCML Up tracks to be realigned by about 1.9km to provide the space for the HS2 tracks to feed in to the two fast lines in the centre of the WCML four-track.
When the subsequent decision was taken to split Phase 2 into two and advance the timescales for Phase 2a, it meant that another interchange with the WCML, south of Crewe station, would come on stream much earlier and would largely usurp the function of Handsacre, leaving the latter only required to enable HS2 trains to access the conventional network to serve Stafford, Stoke-on-Trent and Macclesfield. This change prompted a rethink about the design of the Handsacre Junction, which was simplified – and cheapened – by making the connection to the WCML on the two outer (slow) tracks, removing the need to realign the WCML.
The cancellation of Phase 2 means that Handsacre is returned to the status of the only HS2/WCML interchange and raises questions about the adequacy of its slimmed-down design to fulfil this function. The use of the slow line to feed in and extract fast trains to and from the WCML risks disruption to traffic on the latter, risking delays to services and reducing the capacity. This was recognised in the planning of the project by proposing that, until Phase 2a came on stream, only three services an hour would be run to northern destinations with HS2 trains.
In his evidence to the Transport Committee[1], Professor McNaughton expressed his opinion that the simpler junction only had the capacity to deliver one or two trains an hour to the WCML and that “you cannot deliver the whole of the HS2 Phase 1 service on the slow lines without actually cancelling your freight trains”. According to the professor, a redesign of Handsacre “is inevitable and an unfortunate consequence [of the cancellation of Phase 2], and then bang goes some of the money that you might have saved”.
In his evidence to the Transport Committee Sir Jon Thompson, executive chairman of HS2 Limited, offered a different opinion about the impact of the cancellation of Phase 2 on the design of Handsacre Junction. He reported that the Department for Transport had requested HS2 Ltd to undertake a detailed analysis of a number of matters arising from the decision to cancel Phase 2, including the design of the Handsacre Junction. He said that HS2 Ltd engineers had come to the conclusion that it “was not the rate-limiting step that people initially thought that it might be, and that very little work was required on the junction to facilitate connection back to the west coast main line”. He provided no reasoning behind this conclusion, but told the Committee that he understood that the Secretary of State would be writing to them[2].
Without knowing what the evidence supporting this claim is, it is difficult to understand why the engineers at HS2 Ltd have arrived at a different conclusion to their former technical director. I guess that we will have to wait and see if the Secretary of State’s letter is published.
Good news, or bad news?
Towards the end of CP 946, the Command Paper issued by the Department for Transport to justify the cancellation of Phase 2 of HS2, is a paragraph that is, I’m sure, meant to put a positive slant on this decision.
“This reflects that HS2 Phase 2 would have delivered fewer and slower services from London to at least 20 destinations on the existing main lines – including Stockport, Wilmslow, Penrith and Oxenholme. Blackpool would have lost through trains to London. Kettering, Market Harborough, Leicester and Loughborough would all have also seen slower services to London had HS2 East opened.”[3]
So the cancellation announcement is good news for passengers wishing to use any of the stations listed after HS2 becomes operational, although it is very rare for the Department for Transport to highlight this negative aspect of the HS2 project – probably not something to be surprised about. It should also not be a surprise that the degrading of WCML service post HS2 applies equally well to Phase 1 and, of course, remains the situation for stations south of Birmingham.
I undertook a very detailed investigation of the impact HS2 would have on WCML services in 2015 and e-published my findings and supporting evidence in a 15-part blog series, two parts of which detailed my conclusions about Coventry-London services[4].
I concluded that the current three express services in the peak hours, currently operated by Avanti West Coast, would be reduced to two, and the average number of stops would be increased from one to four (including stops to service commuters to London from the Northampton-Milton Keynes corridor). I also felt it extremely likely that the Pendolinos currently used for the service would be replaced by far-less comfortable commuter rolling stock. So, in effect, what is currently a main-line fast express service would become a stopping commuter service.
The stopping service currently operated by London Midland would similarly suffer in reduction in peak-hours services from three to two.
Stop press – a mayoral plot
Whist I was working on these musings news emerged that a duo of metro mayors (West Midlands and Greater Manchester) were negotiating a scheme to secure private finance to rescue the Birmingham to Manchester rail link in some form: either as a new high-speed scheme, or by making major upgrades to the existing rail connection in the North.
For my part, I cannot image why a private investor would want to pour his cash into the huge money pit that is railway construction, and how there would be any prospect of a return on capital invested, but perhaps I am missing something.
The proposal has got as far as appointing a “chairman” in Sir David Higgins – remember him, one of the previous chairmen of HS2 Ltd – and has had ‘constructive talks’ with Transport Secretary, Mark Harper. The extent of private finance that is backing the proposal is unclear.
The stumbling block to the plans making further progress may turn out to be West Midlands Mayor, Andy Street, admitting that some public cash will still be required to realise the new plans.
[1] HS2 and the environment, Peter Delow (blog), Degrading practices, part 10, 24 April 2015 (https://hs2andtheenvironment.wordpress.com/2015/04/24/degrading-practices-part-10) and Degrading practices, Part 11, 28 April 2015 (https://hs2andtheenvironment.wordpress.com/2015/04/28/degrading-practices-part-11).
[1] Transport Committee, Oral Evidence, 8 November 2023, House of Commons, Q313-Q315 (https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13783/pdf). Prof Andrew McNaughton was technical director of HS2 Ltd from 2009 to 2017.
[2] Transport Committee, Oral Evidence, 10 January 2024, House of Commons, Q395 (https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/14053/pdf)
[3] Network North: Transforming British Transport, CP 946, Department for Transport, 4 October 2023, paragraph 35 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65290f86697260000dccf78b/network-north-transforming-british-transport-print-version.pdf).